Review of Steven Wondu and Ann Lesch Battle for Peace in Sudan: An Analysis of the Abuja Conferences 1992-93 University Press of America Lanham, MD, 2000
by Michael Kevane
This valuable contribution offers a detailed summary and contextualization of the Abuja negotiation between the military regime in Khartoum and the two rebel groups at the time, SPLM (Torit) and SSPLM (Nasir) in 1992-93.
A short introduction lays out the background to the conflict, highlighting the issue of autonomy, both political (particularly with respect to Islamic law) and economic (particularly with respect to sharing of oil revenues). The authors briefly review previous high-level agreements and negotiations. They then introduce the three negotiating parties and their respective teams. Separate chapters then discuss the substance of the negotiations, nicely arranged by the authors.
First up is the tiresome debate over 'national identity'. I find it hard to imagine how negotiators could actually spend time listening and arguing at the platitudinal level that seems to have actually been the case. The first lesson I draw from this chapter is that future negotiations should not include a discussion of national identity: constitution-making is precisely the process of compromising over competing identities and priorities. Most constitutions no longer need to be rhetorically polished and innovative the way earlier constitutions (e.g. U.S.) were. The goal here is practical, not rhetorical. Second up is the definitely-not-tiresome issue of religion and state. It remains startling to read the military regime’s official position: "Why all this fuss?" Reading through the discussion one is forced to ask how constitution-making can take place with negotiators adopting self-contradictory stances. The regime on the one hand says hudud laws are basically impossible to apply in practice, yet they insist that they must be implemented. The regime apparently agreed that there should be no state religion early on, but then refused to sign a communique whose only substantive provision was a clause to that effect. What is the way out on this issue? My own view is that the right process is to have two-stages of constitution-making, with the second stage taking up religious issues. Again, the problem with the perceived need to have a constitution say something like "The Sudan is..." is that the Sudan doesn’t have to be anything. It can and should be in a process of becoming something, of changing, and this can take its own time. Processual, consensual peace is possible and desirable, and is indeed the foundation of succesful strategies like the people-to-people peace process initiated in South Sudan.
Next comes the processual issue of self-determination. The famous "Separation comes from the mouth of the gun" quote of M. El-Amin Khalifa. The discussion makes clear that negotiators for the military dictator (Babangida) himself beholden to self-serving OAU position on boundaries was bound to lead nowhere.
The subject of interim arrangments earns the longest chapter. The conference apparently began with a bit of a farce: nigerian mediators, memebers of a brutal military dictatorship, extolling thie virtues of the Nigerian federal constitution. Farce seemed to be the operative word as the government proposed a ‘Federal’ system with centrally-appointed governors!
There is an annoying tendency to quote text, then say "This shows..." Then add another statement and not clear whether this is author’s interp[retation or direct quote. Many times not clear whether author’s voice or negotiator’s voice. esp. p. 48
Sadly one gathers the impression that does not bode well for the future of Sudan: An overwillingness by both sides to engage in bombastically in procedural marginalia and an unwillingness (apparently) to actually negotiate.’
what kind of state: libertarian, socialist? process of privatization? toll roads? import taxes? monetary system. redistribution. Why an army?