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What are the effects of moving to gender equality? Using CEDAW in cross-country regressions

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Abstract: Commitment to the international gender rights regime is not associated with more rapid economic growth as measured by GDP. But commitment is correlated with some indicators of improvement in the lives of women, even after controlling for other determinants of quality of life. While the effects of CEDAW should not be said to be negligible, advocates of the treaty should not overstate the case.

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Gender inequality holds back the growth of individuals, the development of countries and the evolution of societies, to the disadvantage of both women and men.

United Nations Population Fund

Introduction

The debate over 'women's rights' and 'equality for women' has recently resurfaced amongst economists due to hypothesized effects of gender equity on general economic growth and welfare (World Bank 2001). A number of papers have attempted to estimate the magnitude of the growth effect of gender equality. Some papers focus on the human capital side, asking whether education for women might contribute more to economic growth. The usual reasoning is that women exhibit preferences for investments in child quality that have positive externalities, and leads to more rapid economic growth. Men, the reasoning goes, favor investments that yield high private but low social returns. The micro evidence on these different choices of men and women is very convincing, but the macro evidence, from growth regressions, has been obscured by problems of mis-measurement, omitted variables, and endogeneity. The macro literature follows the lead of Barro and Lee (1994) who found that in a growth regression with men and women's secondary education attainment explaining growth in GDP, the coefficient on women's attainment was negative. Barro and Lee interpreted this as a measurement/omitted variable problem: countries with a high spread between men's and women's education- gender inequality- were more 'backward', and so grew slowly. Critics pointed out that 'backwardness' in a growth regression context should have already been captured in the level of initial income, and that the

negative coefficient appeared to be due, in their sample, to relatively high income Latin America, which also had high levels of female attainment but low economic growth.

Regardless of the problems with the finding, it did serve the purpose of initiating more careful work on the issue. Lorgelly (2000) reviews this work. One well-cited paper is that of Dollar and Gatti (1999), who argue for a strong causal relation between gender equality and GDP growth. They suppose that variables measuring civil liberties and the religious affiliation of the population are good instruments for secondary school enrolments of men and women in growth regressions; gender equality is a kind of cultural choice. The focus on an input approach to GDP leads them to neglect the possibility that civil liberties might affect growth in much the same way as 'rule of law' (which they do include).

This paper attempts to address some of these problems by using more data and longer time periods, by considering other outcomes besides growth in GDP, by using a very general indicator of gender equity instead of educational attainment ratios, and by using different instruments to control for some of the endogeneity problems.

The measure of gender equity constructed focuses on the Convention for the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) and the international human rights regime for gender equity that it reinforced. CEDAW sets standards for women's rights in the political, cultural, economic, social, and family sectors, and calls for action to redress and arrest many forms of gender discrimination. Furthermore, the Convention calls for specific actions to remedy discrimination. The United Nations General Assembly adopted CEDAW on December 18, 1979, and the Convention entered into force on September 3, 1981, after it had been ratified by 20 states. As of early 2003, 171 states have ratified the treaty. Afghanistan ratified the convention on 5 March 2003, leaving ten countries that have not yet ratified CEDAW: United

Arab Emirates, Brunei, Iran, Oman, Qatar, Sudan, Somalia, Sao Tome and Principe, Syria, and United States.

Many commentators are quick to suggest that international treaties such as CEDAW are no more than empty gestures; while they do bind states to treat their own citizens in certain ways, they have no enforcement power. Nevertheless, there is a world of difference between a treaty having no effect and a treaty having some, perhaps small effect, when it comes to gender rights. Gender affects behavior across an enormous range of activities, especially in developing countries with large non-corporate sectors. Blatant cases exist of clear unequal status as economic actors, where women are legal minors under the tutelage of their husbands. As Geddes and Lueck (2000) point out in their paper on the history of the overturning of coverture laws in the United States, unequal rights often limit the self-ownership of women. Self-ownership is essential to residual claimancy, and the degree to which people are residual claimants of their efforts may likely be thought to be a key determinant of innovation and investment. To the extent that CEDAW affects institutions of self-ownership, even marginally, there may be significant economic outcomes.

This paper considers problems of measurement and endogeneity involved in analysis of the effects of the treaty, particularly in regards to influencing rates of growth of GDP, education, and other measures of well-being. CEDAW is somewhat remarkable because so many ratifiers have entered strong reservations to their ratification. The ‘quality’ of ratification has been quite different for different countries, perhaps more so than any other human rights treaty. Many predominantly Muslim countries ratified the treaty subject to major reservations that essentially rendered the treaty meaningless. CEDAW also had many countries that delayed for many years their final ratification, compared with other human rights treaties. Perhaps countries signed

slowly over twenty years as gender relations evolved for other reasons. Ratification of the treaty then followed these changes. Without careful treatment, a spurious or mis-measured correlation between ratification and economic changes may result.

The findings are mixed. Commitment to the international gender rights regime is not associated with more rapid economic growth as measured by GDP. But commitment is correlated with some indicators of improvements in the lives of women, even after controlling for other determinants of quality of life. While the effects of CEDAW should not be said to be negligible, advocates of the treaty should not overstate the case. The mixed findings of this analysis further suggest greater caution in ascribing causality in the relationship between gender equality and growth when gender equality is measured by educational attainment. The endogeneity of education decisions, made by private parties in response to changing or anticipating changes in economic conditions, makes the determination of causality very problematic.

The efficacy of CEDAW: Mechanisms for change

There are three ways that ratification of an international treaty such as CEDAW directly impacts domestic practice of gender relations. First, CEDAW calls for changes in national constitutions when these are in contradiction to the treaty. Second, CEDAW calls for enactment of legislative and executive policies to bring the countries laws into conformity with the treaty. Third, the judicial system in a country might re-interpret previous law in the light of the treaty commitment.

Constitutional change

There seems to be no comprehensive record of constitutional or legislative changes around the world due directly to CEDAW. Treaty advocates cite the redrafting of the Brazilian

and Ugandan constitutions as instances where CEDAW figured prominently in national constitutional debate.

Executive and legislative policy change

States vary tremendously in how they have implemented CEDAW, but again there is no record or coding of national gender policy before and after ratification of the treaty. Some implementation reports presented to the Committee detail new policies, goals and achievements. Other reports reveal the paucity of action by member states. Too often these reports are filled with poor quality data on women's status vis-a-vis men, with no evidence of change in governmental policy. The committee itself often finds fault with the lack of commitment evident in many countries. Angela King, UN special adviser on Gender Issues, noted that (1998), "ratification has not necessarily meant policy and legal changes in some states parties."

Judicial enforcement

In the absence of concerted efforts by legislatures and executives to change gender policy, it is the judiciary of many countries that ends up doing the work of bringing domestic law into conformity with the treaty. Legal systems vary in how much weight is given to the provisions of treaties ratified by national governments. The British common law tradition, for example, is often thought to treat international treaties such as CEDAW as 'non-self-executing' and unenforceable without the passage of separate statutory law by the appropriate legislative body. Other legal traditions take treaties to be immediately binding. Interesting and important decisions on CEDAW have been forthcoming from around the globe, and from both legal traditions.

One decision that probably has affected the most number of persons is the decision of the Indian Supreme Court, in *Apparel Export Promotion Council versus A.K. Chopra*, decided on

January 20, 1999. Mr. Chopra attempted to sexually harass a secretary while working as executive for Apparel Export Promotion Council. He was fired from his position, and then sued the Council, alleging (with lower court agreement), that since he did not actually commit any sexual act, this was not harassment. The Supreme Court, using CEDAW, made major case law in defining sexual harassment along lines of intimidation. The Court was explicit in noting that the Parliament had not clarified definitions of sexual harassment, but by ratification of CEDAW the domestic courts were bound to consider such cases. In the absence of legislative guidance, the Court promulgated its own standard to be in conformity with CEDAW. In the words of the Court (1999):

These international instruments cast an obligation on the Indian State to gender-sensitise its laws and the courts are under an obligation to see that the message of the international instruments is not allowed to be drowned. This Court has in numerous cases emphasised that while discussing constitutional requirements, court and counsel must never forget the core principle embodied in the international conventions and instruments and as far as possible, give effect to the principles contained in those international instruments. The courts are under an obligation to give due regard to international conventions and norms for construing domestic laws, more so, when there is no inconsistency between them and there is a void in domestic law

Another well-known case had the Tanzanian High Court invalidating in 1990 customary law that prevented women from inheriting clan land from their fathers. The case is summarized nicely on an International Labor Office website (2002):

Holaria Pastory brought a court challenge to the Haya customary law that prevented her from selling clan land. She had inherited land from her father, through his will, but when she tried to sell it her nephew applied to have the sale voided. Tanzania's Declaration of Customary Law clearly prohibited her sale of the land in s. 20 of its rules of inheritance. Pastory argued that this constraint on women's property rights violated the Constitution. The court was faced with the difficulty of interpreting a constitutional guarantee of freedom from discrimination that did not make any specific reference to women. The court relied on the fact that the Tanzanian Government had ratified the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), as

well as other international treaties and covenants, to find that women were constitutionally protected from discrimination. The court stated that "the principles enunciated in the above named documents are a standard below which any civilised nation will be ashamed to fall". The High Court decided that the rules of inheritance in the Declaration of Customary Law were unconstitutional and contravened the international conventions which Tanzania had ratified. Thus, the rights and restrictions around the sale of clan land are the same for women and men.

One last example from Zambia illustrates the limited scope of CEDAW alone to effect change. A gender activist, Sara Longwe, sued the Lusaka InterContinental Hotel. The hotel had a policy that unaccompanied women were not allowed onto the premises. The motive was to discourage prostitution. Ms. Longwe, however, saw the policy as being discriminatory: an unaccompanied woman was presumed guilty, and denied entry into a 'public space'. Longwe won the case, with the justices citing CEDAW in their decision. Unfortunately, the Longwe case seems not to have been precedent setting, for a new Lusaka High Court judge dismissed a similar case brought by Elizabeth Mwanza in 1997. She, too, was evicted from a hotel for being unaccompanied by a man.

Ironically, all of these cases concern countries with common-law traditions. Perhaps countries with strong common law traditions, such as the United States, are reluctant to ratify precisely because they fear that their judicial system will actually implement the provisions of CEDAW.

These direct avenues to change in gender relations stemming from ratification of the treaty do not preclude other, indirect, effects on gender relations that may in turn affect economically relevant decisions and outcomes. Ratification of the treaty may bring press coverage, embolden activists and individuals, change social norms, and alter local discourses of

gender equity. These indirect effects underscore the need for broad, macro-level analysis of how ratification of CEDAW is correlated with various measures of well-being.

Commitment to CEDAW and human rights regime more generally

Ratification by a state of CEDAW is not a sufficient measure of the commitment of a state to the evolving gender rights regime. Numerous reservations to the convention made by some ratifiers basically render ratification meaningless (Clark 1991; Cook 1990; Cook and Columbia University School of Law 1994; Jenefsky 1991). Article 28 of the Convention states that reservations may be made at the time of ratification or accession, although reservations that are incompatible with the convention are supposedly prohibited. (Some ratifiers have objected to reservations made by newer ratifiers on these grounds, but these objections have no force in preventing official United Nations recognition of ratification.) Of the 171 countries that have ratified the convention, 55 have done so with reservations to one or more of the articles. Half of these reservations were technical or symbolic (some states reserved the right to continue male privilege in the exercise of royal and chiefly power.) The other half of states entering reservations were excepting themselves from important substantive obligations of the treaty. A report prepared by the UN-CEDAW secretariat was scathing regarding many of the reservations of the predominantly Muslim states that constituted most of the states entering serious reservations (Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women 1996).

A cursory examination of the reservations of many of these states suggests that they are, perhaps, incompatible with the object and purpose of the convention. The UN-CEDAW secretariat singled out Malaysia, Maldives, Tunisia and Pakistan as having entered general reservations that called into question their acceptance of obligations under the convention.

Kuwait reserved the right to continue to exclude women from voting. Saudi Arabia ratified the treaty in 2000, but subject to a general reservation that is worth quoting in full: "In case of contradiction between any term of the Convention and the norms of Islamic law, the Kingdom is not under obligation to observe the contradictory terms of the Convention." Egypt's reservation to Article 16 on equality in marriage was that marriage law that ensured rough equality in outcomes was compatible with the convention, even though the treatment was unequal by gender (Jenefsky 1991). The wife receives a payment upon divorce, the husband does not. Therefore, divorce could be harder to obtain for the wife than for the husband. Egypt also opted out of articles 2, 9, and 29.

For the analysis below, an indicator of 'commitment' to the gender rights regime is constructed. This indicator takes into account the 'strength' of ratification of CEDAW, and is higher for states ratifying without reservations, low for states with reservations that basically state the country will not actually be bound by any provision of the treaty that conflicts with existing domestic law, and intermediate for states with specific but substantive reservations. The more reservations the lower the strength of ratification. The indicator variable also takes into account compliance with the reporting provisions of the treaty by coding completion of the regular reports that members of the treaty are required to submit to the UN-CEDAW committee. Finally, the commitment indicator is extended backwards in time by coding the earlier gender rights treaties (only ratification is coded for these). CEDAW consolidated a smaller gender rights regime that consisted of the Convention of the Nationality of Married Women, the Convention on Consent and Marriage Minimum Age, and the Convention on the Political Rights of Women. These Conventions were opened for ratification during the 1950s and 1960s.

Patterns of commitment have indeed varied substantially between Muslim and non-Muslim countries, as seen in Figure 1, where commitment of new states (following the break-up of the Soviet Union) are also represented. The measure of commitment is crude, but an improvement over using ratification alone as an indicator of participation and commitment to the emerging human rights regime of gender equality. Additionally, because the measure is a more direct measure of deliberate state policy, it may be less subject to charges of endogeneity compared with using educational attainment as an indicator of gender equality.

For comparative purposes, another indicator of commitment to general human rights treaties is also constructed, by simply adding up instances of ratification over time for each country.

Determinants of commitment to CEDAW

Table 1 reports the mean and standard deviation of the variables considered in the analysis, for three time periods. Notice how the index of commitment to gender rights rises from 4.85 in 1972, to 9.63 in 1984, to 14.99 in 1992. Likewise, there is similar increase in commitment to the general human rights regime. The percent of women on Olympic teams likewise rises over the decades. This variable is used below as an indicator of elite gender norms, since Olympic athletes in poor countries are typically part of the urban elite rather than from poor and marginalized communities.

In order to ascertain the effects of commitment to the international regime, cross-country growth regressions are estimated. The focus is on the effects of greater commitment to gender rights, and an instrumental variables approach is used to control for endogeneity (that

commitment responds to GDP or other changes in the economy rather than causing those changes).

Table 2 presents results from regressions explaining the level of commitment to gender rights. These are estimated with a random-effects, cross-sectional, time-series regression. Results are in columns (1), (2) and (4). For comparative purposes, column (3) reports estimates from regressions explaining commitment to the broader human rights regime. As can be seen, predominantly Muslim countries are much less committed to the international human rights regime than other states. States that are legitimate (in the sense of Englebert (2000), of never having been colonized, or after decolonization of reverting to the pre-colonial state structures) seem to be less committed the human rights regimes; perhaps illegitimate states feel a greater need to participate more fully in international governance regimes, if only for domestic propaganda. The share of participation of women in Olympic teams is strongly correlated with the indicator of commitment to gender rights, and with commitment to human rights in general. GDP is negatively associated with commitment, and when instrumented in column (4) the magnitude of the coefficient rises substantially. Perhaps richer countries see human rights treaties as inappropriate codification of their existing and largely gender neutral domestic legal regimes. Certainly this is the case for the United States' minimal engagement with the human rights regimes. Finally, prior ratification of the Vienna convention on the interpretation of treaties, a kind of treaty about treaty procedure, or meta-treaty, is strongly correlated with participation in human rights regimes.

These results suggest that appropriate instruments for estimating the impact of gender rights on GDP may be these three measures: share of women in Olympic competitions; extent to which the state is guided by Islamic *shari'a* law or preferences against equality by Muslim elites in

predominantly Muslim societies; and disposition to participate generally in the international treaty framework, as evidenced by ratification of the Vienna convention on the interpretation of treaties.

Table 3 then reports the estimated coefficients of regressions explaining growth in GDP in ten-year periods. Columns (1)-(3) report various specifications where the degree of commitment is not instrumented, while column (4) reports the results for a regression where commitment is instrumented. Commitment to the gender rights regime is not statistically significant except in (4), where when estimated with instruments the coefficient is significant but negative (although very small in magnitude). In (3) the general human rights regime also has a negative effect on GDP growth. Results were similar when using five-year periods, and with a fixed effects specification, only the civil war average is statistically significant, and even then in only a sub-sample of regressions. In light of previous strong statements regarding the effects of gender equality on economic growth, this negative finding is rather surprising and deserves continued scrutiny.

While commitment to the gender regime seemed to not be associated with increases in GDP, it was associated with improvements in indicators of educational equality. Table 4 reports results of regressions explaining three different measures of educational attainment and equality for females- the female illiteracy rate, the percent girls in primary school, and the ratio of girls to boys in primary and secondary. In all three cases, commitment to gender rights regime is associated with improvements in the indicators, after controlling for level of GDP and civil wars and extent of democracy in the country. The magnitudes of the effects, however, are on the small side.

Table 5 continues this line of enquiry, with results of simple cross-sectional regressions explaining a number of indicators of gender welfare at the turn of the century. The level of commitment to the gender rights regime was not significant in any of the regressions except that explaining the percent of women in legislative bodies.

Conclusion

The gender rights regime that resulted in the CEDAW and subsequent deepening of international norms and agreements has been hailed as a major accomplishment of the twentieth century. Yet, because of non-ratification by the United States, and limited compliance with the convention by many predominantly Muslim states, discussion of the convention still turns on assessments of its costs and benefits. Given the recent interest in the relationship between gender equity and growth, a number of papers have suggested strong causal links. The results of this paper suggest that advocates of the CEDAW gender rights regime should not be hasty in asserting a bounty of positive spillovers. To date, the macro-level effects of CEDAW and the gender rights regime in general have been limited.

Figure 1: Commitment to gender rights




Table 1: Variables used in analysis

variable		Mean	Std. Dev.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Mean	Std. Dev.
		1972		1984		1994	
commithrwomen	Index of commitment to gender rights regime	4.85	5.19	9.63	8.03	14.99	7.93
commithrgeneral	Index of commitment to general human rights regime	0.82	1.11	2.03	1.48	4.67	1.82
muslim	Is country predominantly Muslim? 1=yes	0.22	0.42	0.22	0.42	0.23	0.42
muslfrac	Does country have sizable Muslim fraction? 1=yes	0.08	0.28	0.07	0.26	0.08	0.27
legit	Is state legitimate (per Englebert 1999)? 1=yes	0.66	0.48	0.65	0.48	0.64	0.48
lpoptot	Log of total population	15.59	1.68	15.62	1.81	15.83	1.71
partolyioc	Did country participate in summer Olympic Games? 1=yes	0.76	0.43	0.80	0.40	0.95	0.21
olymtotioc	Size of Olympic team (0 if did not participate)	41.90	70.75	40.66	78.14	57.68	100.40
femolyratioc	Percent of women on Olympic team (0 if did not participate)	0.07	0.10	0.11	0.15	0.25	0.19
urbanpop1	Percent of population that is urban	42.03	25.52	47.29	24.88	53.40	23.40
viennarat	Did country ratify Vienna Treaty? 1=yes	0.12	0.33	0.28	0.45	0.43	0.50
leg_socialist	Was legal system socialist? 1=yes	0.10	0.30	0.09	0.29	0.18	0.38
avgcivilwar	Percent of decade country in civil war or other conflict	0.06	0.19	0.14	0.32	0.11	0.27
polity2num	Index of democratic versus autocratic (from -10 to +10)	-0.01	0.08	-0.01	0.08	0.03	0.07
blackprem	Black market exchange rate premium	0.03	0.08	0.12	0.53	0.06	0.35
realover	Real overvaluation of exchange rate	1.06	0.32	1.04	0.45	1.16	0.69
termsoftrade	Terms of trade index	0.11	0.03	0.12	0.04	0.10	0.02
grosscapformation	Gross capital formation as percent of GDP	21.39	8.48	22.02	9.08	22.20	9.81
govtexpnd	Government spending as percent of GDP	14.53	5.14	16.58	7.55	16.37	7.24
lpoptot	Log of total population	15.76	1.62	15.83	1.67	15.91	1.62
growthtenyr	growth in real GDP per capita over decade	0.02	0.03	0.01	0.03	0.01	0.04
real GDP US dollars	real GDP per capita in US dollars	5302.90	7732.95	5726.19	8681.91	5748.77	9382.32

Sources: World Bank Development Indicators (2002); Easterly and Levine dataset available at <http://www.worldbank.org/research/growth/ddeale.htm>; Polity IV dataset; Englebert (1999); International Olympic Committee; United Nations Treaty database.

Table 2: Regression results explaining indicator of commitment to rights regimes

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Commitment to CEDAW regime for post-1980 period only	Commitment to gender rights regime for period 1960-2000	Commitment to general human rights regime for period 1960-2000	Commitment to CEDAW regime with GDP instrumented
muslim	-4.961 (7.04)**	-4.663 (4.22)**	-0.524 (2.25)*	-5.581 (4.87)**
muslfrac	-2.400 (2.05)*	-0.752 (0.42)	-0.398 (1.05)	-4.667 (2.92)**
legit	-0.649 (0.96)	-4.609 (4.50)**	-1.343 (6.12)**	2.334 (1.72)
lpoptot	1.211 (7.62)**	3.202 (14.32)**	0.519 (10.30)**	1.036 (4.63)**
partolymioc	-1.103 (4.24)**	-1.017 (4.14)**	-0.396 (5.09)**	-1.062 (3.49)**
olymtotioc	-0.003 (1.33)	-0.003 (1.48)	-0.001 (1.42)	-0.001 (0.37)
femolyratioc	4.050 (4.07)**	6.561 (6.25)**	2.744 (8.27)**	3.761 (3.36)**
Log real GDP per capita, USD	-1.717 (6.90)**	0.833 (3.40)**	-0.173 (2.52)*	-6.520 (4.71)**
urbanpop1	0.197 (14.06)**	0.230 (18.06)**	0.083 (23.24)**	0.409 (7.85)**
leg_socialist		1.420 (1.16)	0.613 (2.31)*	
viennarat		5.225 (21.93)**	2.128 (29.04)**	
Constant	-7.511 (2.54)*	-54.887 (14.32)**	-7.987 (8.85)**	18.825 (2.03)*
Observations	2771	4672	4672	2228
Number of group(ccode)	153	151	151	136
Absolute value of z-statistics in parentheses; * significant at 5% level; ** significant at 1% level; Instruments in column (4) include real overvaluation, landlocked, and black market exchange rate premium				

Table 3: Regressions explaining variation in growth rate of per capita GDP (over ten year periods)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4) Instrumental variables
Log real GDP per capita, USD	0.007 (0.57)	0.013 (1.19)	0.017 (1.53)	0.007 (0.54)
Square log real GDP	-0.000 (0.28)	-0.001 (1.42)	-0.001 (1.25)	-0.000 (0.19)
blackprem	0.010 (0.89)			
realover	-0.012 (3.64)**		-0.011 (3.91)**	-0.012 (3.92)**
termsoftrade	-0.017 (0.47)			
grosscaptformation	0.000 (0.32)		0.000 (0.15)	-0.000 (0.83)
govtexpenditure	-0.000 (1.03)		-0.000 (0.15)	-0.000 (0.13)
commithrwomen	-0.000 (1.33)	-0.000 (1.80)		-0.001 (2.78)**
avgcivilwar		-0.010 (1.88)	-0.009 (1.71)	-0.010 (1.68)
ethnolinguistic fragmentation		-0.001 (0.11)		
legit		0.016 (3.07)**		
polity2num		0.047 (2.07)*		
commithrgeneral			-0.002 (2.88)**	
Constant	-0.003 (0.07)	-0.028 (0.68)	-0.040 (0.98)	0.002 (0.04)
Observations	249	387	289	289
Number of group(ccode)	90	115	102	102
Absolute value of z-statistics in parentheses; * significant at 5% level; ** significant at 1% level; instruments for commithrwomen in (4) are muslim, femolyratioc, partolymioc, olymtotioc, and viennarat				

Table 4: Cross-sectional, time series regressions (random effects model) explaining variation in various measures of improved welfare of females

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Female illiteracy rate	Gross primary enrolment, percent female	Girls per hundred boys in primary and secondary education
Log real GDP per capita, USD	-59.885	78.164	36.207
	(9.10)**	(7.48)**	(4.86)**
Square log real GDP p.c., USD	3.143	-4.474	-2.003
	(7.49)**	(6.63)**	(4.16)**
avgcivilwartenyr	-3.506	6.935	6.066
	(1.45)	(1.74)	(1.95)
polity2num	-22.856	19.596	28.987
	(2.18)*	(1.15)	(2.13)*
commithrwomen	-0.609	0.369	0.331
	(7.61)**	(2.74)**	(2.90)**
Constant	308.200	-241.748	-73.381
	(12.18)**	(6.14)**	(2.61)**
Observations	343	318	247
Number of group(ccode)	122	124	115

Table 5: Cross-section ordinary least squares estimates of how commitment to gender rights regime is correlated with various outcomes

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	Maternal mortality (deaths per hundred women)	Indicator of extent of formal quotas in political process favoring women (0-3)	Indicator of divorce rights for women (0-7) with higher meaning more rights	Percent of births delivered by skilled midwives, nurses or other practitioners in 2000	Percent of parliament or other legislative body that was female in 2000
Log real GDP per capita, USD	-1.379	0.304	-0.440	63.650	-8.778
	(8.32)**	(0.62)	(0.35)	(6.12)**	(2.17)*
Square log real GDP p.c., USD	0.077	-0.022	0.073	-3.250	0.714
	(7.19)**	(0.71)	(0.92)	(4.85)**	(2.79)**
polity2num	-1.312	3.733	-1.475	30.977	-16.423
	(2.70)**	(2.35)*	(0.38)	(0.95)	(1.24)
commithrwomen	0.005	0.004	0.051	0.105	0.453
	(1.26)	(0.31)	(1.62)	(0.40)	(4.13)**
Constant	6.150	-0.349	1.842	-216.088	27.381
	(9.86)**	(0.18)	(0.39)	(5.48)**	(1.75)
Observations	147	147	145	123	126
R-squared	0.61	0.05	0.22	0.64	0.38
Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses; * significant at 5% level; ** significant at 1% level					

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